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A	 little	over	 fifty-five	years	ago,	 the	Supreme	Court	of	 the	United	
States	 decided	 Gideon	 v.	 Wainwright.2	 The	 essence	 of	 Gideon’s	
reasoning	was	that	in	criminal	cases,	indigent	defendants	were	entitled	
to	justice.	The	Gideon	Court	acknowledged:	
From	 the	very	beginning,	 our	 state	 and	national	 constitutions	 and	
laws	 have	 laid	 great	 emphasis	 on	 procedural	 and	 substantive	
safeguards	designed	to	assure	fair	trials	before	impartial	tribunals	in	
which	every	defendant	stands	equal	before	the	 law.	This	noble	ideal	





as	 the	 Court	 put	 it,	 “fair	 trials	 before	 impartial	 tribunals”4	 (that	 is,	














Both	 are	 central	 to	 realizing	 justice.	 They	 are	 embedded	 in	 the	 Due	
Process	Clauses	of	the	Fifth	and	Fourteenth	Amendments	as	well	as	the	
Equal	Protection	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
This	 Article	 contends	 that	 procedural	 fairness	 and	 equal	
protection	require	legal	assistance	of	counsel	for	indigent	civil	litigants,	
especially	 in	 adversarial	 proceedings.	 As	 United	 States	 District	 Judge	
Robert	 Sweet	 argued	 in	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 New	 York	 Bar	 Association:	
“[W]e	need	 a	 civil	Gideon,	 that	 is,	 an	 expanded	 constitutional	 right	 to	
counsel	 in	 civil	matters.	 Lawyers,	 and	 lawyers	 for	 all,	 are	essential	 to	
the	functioning	of	an	effective	justice	system.”6	
Part	II	of	this	Article	briefly	recapitulates	the	facts	and	reasoning	
in	 Gideon’s	 case.	 To	 illuminate	 constitutional	 bases	 for	 recognizing	 a	
civil	 right	 to	 counsel,	 Part	 II	 revisits	McCulloch	 v.	 Maryland7	 because	
McCulloch	 articulates	 widely	 accepted	 American	 constitutional	 law	
interpretive	 approaches.	 In	 addition,	 Part	 II	 outlines	 several	 tools	 in	
McCulloch’s	tool	kit	and	applies	them	to	the	constitutional	foundations	
for	 a	 civil	 Gideon—namely:	 the	 Fifth,	 Sixth,	 Ninth,	 and	 Fourteenth	
Amendments	to	the	Constitution.	
Furthermore,	 regarding	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 in	 civil	
cases,	 Part	 II	 critiques	 the	 2011	 Roberts	 Court’s	 overly	 restrictive	
decision	 in	 Turner	 v.	 Rogers.8	 Nevertheless,	 in	 light	 of	 Turner,	 the	
Article	 acknowledges	 the	 probable	 futility	 of	 initiating	 federal	
constitutional	 litigation	 to	elucidate	 the	broad	parameters	of	 indigent	
persons’	 human	 right	 to	 counsel—including	 legal	 counsel	 in	 civil	
proceedings.	In	fact,	in	light	of	the	composition	of	the	current	Supreme	
Court,	 bringing	 such	 litigation	 now	 would	 likely	 be	 extremely	
counterproductive.	
Given	these	practical	constraints,	Part	III	of	the	Article	affirms	the	
need	 for	 legislation	 to	 address	 the	 massive	 shortfall	 in	 legal	
	
	 5.	 Id.	
	 6.	 ABA	 Resolution	 112A,	 Report	 to	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates	 at	 7	 (Aug.	 7,	 2006),	
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_06A112A.authcheckdam.pdf	 (quoting	Robert	W.	 Sweet,	Civil	 “Gideon”	 and	 Justice	 in	 the	






representation	 available	 to	 indigent	 persons	 in	 the	 United	 States.9	
Specifically,	 this	 Part	 outlines	 and	 endorses	 provisions	 of	 ABA	
Resolution	 112A—unanimously	 adopted	 by	 the	 ABA	 House	 of	
Delegates	 in	 2006—urging	 federal,	 state,	 and	 territorial	 governments	
to	provide	legal	counsel	as	a	matter	of	right	at	public	expense	to	 low-
income	persons	 in	 those	 categories	 of	 adversarial	 proceedings	where	
basic	 human	 needs	 are	 at	 stake,	 such	 as	 those	 involving	 shelter,	
sustenance,	 safety,	 health,	 or	 child	 custody,	 as	 determined	 by	 each	
jurisdiction.10	
In	addition,	Part	III	builds	upon	the	theoretical	argument	outlined	
in	Part	 II,	by	contending	 that	 the	Framers	of	 the	Constitution	of	1787	
intended	to	protect	human	liberty	on	the	basis	of	fairness	and	equality	
as	evidenced	by	the	words	of	the	Declaration	of	Independence:	
We	 hold	 these	 truths	 to	 be	 self-evident,	 that	 all	 men	 are	
created	 equal,	 that	 they	 are	 endowed	 by	 their	 Creator	with	
certain	unalienable	Rights,	that	among	these	are	Life,	Liberty,	
and	 the	 pursuit	 of	 Happiness.	 That,	 to	 secure	 these	 rights,	
Governments	 are	 instituted	 among	 Men,	 deriving	 their	 just	
powers	from	the	consent	of	the	governed.11	
Thus,	 the	 Declaration	 literally	 states	 that	 the	 United	 States	 was	
established	to	secure	liberty	and	equality	for	all.	
Of	 course,	 the	question	arises,	what	did	 the	Framers	mean	when	
they	 said	 that	 “all	men	 are	 created	 equal”?12	 Did	 the	 Framers	 simply	
mean	 that	 all	 males	 like	 themselves	 were	 created	 equal?	 Did	 the	
Framers	 have	 a	 broader	 audience	 in	 mind?	 After	 all,	 evidence	 exists	
that,	 in	 practice,	 the	 Framers	 failed	 to	 live	 up	 to	 the	 Declaration’s	
professed	 ethic	 of	 universal	 freedom	 and	 equality.13	 Thus,	 Professors	
Daniel	Farber	and	Suzanna	Sherry	contend	that:	
Eighteenth-century	 Americans	 meant	 many	 things	 by	 the	
term	 “equality.”	 With	 Locke,	 they	 believed	 men	 were	 born	
	
	 9.	 LEGAL	 SERVICES	 CORPORATION,	 The	 Justice	 Gap:	 Measuring	 the	 Unmet	 Civil	 Legal	 Needs	 of	










claim	 to	 rule	 over	 others.	 Despite	 its	 apparent	 breadth,	 this	
eighteenth-century	 egalitarianism	 was	 extremely	 limited.	 It	
did	 not	 lead	 many	 Americans	 to	 conclude	 that	 slavery	 was	
wrong.	Nor	did	most	American	republicans	extend	equality	to	
those	 who	 did	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 political	 process,	
including	women,	 Indians,	 children,	 and—in	 some	 places	 at	
some	 times—those	 who	 lacked	 property	 qualifications	 for	
voting.14	
On	March	31,	1776,	in	a	perceptive	letter	Abigail	Adams	wrote	to	




for	you	 to	make	 I	desire	you	would	Remember	 the	Ladies,	 and	be	
more	generous	and	favourable	to	them	than	your	ancestors.	Do	not	





In	 short,	 a	 strong	 argument	 exists	 that	 the	 Framers’	 deeds	were	
hypocritical.	Moreover,	the	hypocrisy	argument	has	support	in	the	text	
of	the	Constitution,	which	among	other	things	provided	for	importation	
of	 slaves	and	 indentured	 servants	until	180816	 and	effectively	 limited	
the	franchise	to	males.17	
	
							14.	 	 Id.;	 see	 also	 1	 SAMUEL	 ELIOT	 MORISON,	 THE	 OXFORD	 HISTORY	 OF	 THE	 AMERICAN	 PEOPLE:	
PREHISTORY	 TO	1789	 at	 295	 (1972)	 (“Did	 Jefferson	 think	 of	 blacks	when	 he	wrote,	 ‘All	men	 are	
created	equal’?	His	subsequent	career	indicates	that	he	did	not;	that	in	his	view	Negroes	were	not	
‘men.’”);	PETER	N.	CAROLL	&	DAVID	W.	NOBLE,	THE	FREE	AND	THE	UNFREE:	A	PROGRESSIVE	HISTORY	OF	THE	
UNITED	STATES	 114–15	 (3d	ed.	2001)	 (“The	principles	of	 revolution,	 Jefferson	explained,	did	not	
lurk	 in	 the	 intricate	mysteries	of	constitutional	 law;	 they	were	not	obscure	or	scholarly.	Rather,	
they	were	intuitive,	within	the	capacity	of	most	people,	and	they	legitimated	bold	acts	in	defense	
of	‘life,	liberty	and	the	pursuit	of	happiness.’”).	
	 15.	 Letter	 from	 Abigail	 Adams	 to	 John	 Adams,	 2	 (Mar.	 31,	 1776),	
https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17760331aa.	
	 16.	 U.S.	CONST.	 art.	 I,	 §	9,	 cl.	1	 (“The	Migration	or	 Importation	of	 such	Persons	as	any	of	 the	
States	now	existing	shall	 think	proper	to	admit,	shall	not	be	prohibited	by	the	Congress	prior	to	
the	 Year	 one	 thousand	 eight	 hundred	 and	 eight,	 but	 a	 Tax	 or	 duty	 may	 be	 imposed	 on	 such	
Importation,	not	exceeding	ten	dollars	for	each	Person.”).	







limited	vision	of	 freedom	and	equality,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 the	Framers	
implicitly	 expected	 that	 legal	 decision	 makers	 would	 be	 a	 privileged	
class	 like	 themselves:	 upper-middle	 class	 and	 upper-class	 white	
males.18	 And	 that	 all	 such	 members	 of	 the	 privileged	 legal	 decision-
making	class	would	construe	and	apply	the	Constitution	as	the	decision	
makers	 would	 want	 the	 Constitution	 to	 be	 construed	 and	 applied	 to	
themselves.	 In	 short,	 the	 Framers	 proceeded	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	
undergirding	 American	 law	 and	 society	 would	 be	 the	 basic	 norm	
commonly	 expressed	 as	 follows:	 “in	 everything	 do	 to	 others	 as	 you	
would	 have	 them	 do	 to	 you.”19	 The	 one	 caveat	 would	 be	 who	
constituted	 the	 “others.”	 A	 strong	 argument	 exists	 that	 the	 Framers	
embraced	 a	 not	 so	 Golden	 Rule	which	would	 require	 treating	 only	 a	
privileged	few	as	you	would	wish	to	be	treated.	
At	 least	two	responses	are	appropriate	in	response	to	this	 line	of	
attack.	 First,	 why	 not	 give	 the	 Framers	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 doubt	 and	
presume	that	they	were	acting	in	good	faith?	For	instance,	there	were	




have	 the	 Qualifications	 requisite	 for	 Electors	 of	 the	 most	 numerous	 Branch	 of	 the	 State	
Legislature.”).	 Because	 the	 qualifications	 for	 holding	 office	 in	 the	 State	 Legislatures	 required	 in	
nearly	all	 states	 that	a	person	be	male,	women	were	effectively	excluded	 from	voting	 in	 federal	
elections.	
	 18.	 See	 FARBER	&	SHERRY,	 supra	 note	 13,	 at	 14–15	 (“The	 eighteenth-century	 republicans	 on	
both	 sides	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 expected	 that	 a	 ‘natural	 aristocracy’	 would	 spring	 up	 to	 govern	 the	
country.	 Composed	 of	 those	with	 extraordinary	 talent,	 the	 natural	 aristocracy	would	 exemplify	




A.	 Hernandez,	When	 the	 Wise	 Latina	 Judge	 Meets	 A	 Living	 Constitution—Why	 It	 Is	 A	 Matter	 of	
Perspective,	17	TEX.	HISP.	J.	L.	&	POLICY	53,	97	(2011)	(“The	framers	were	white,	male	landowners	
and	 as	 result,	 conferred	 all	 authority,	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 vote,	 to	 their	 brethren.”);	 Ann	 M.	
Burkhart,	 The	 Constitutional	 Underpinnings	 of	 Homelessness,	 40	 HOUS.	 L.	 REV.	 211,	 240	 (2003)	
(“The	 question	 whether	 to	 hold	 the	 convention	 had	 not	 been	 put	 to	 a	 popular	 vote,	 and	 the	
delegates	 were	 not	 chosen	 by	 the	 electorate,	 but	 by	 the	 state	 legislatures.	 Unsurprisingly,	
therefore,	the	constitutional	delegates	were	virtually	all	members	of	the	upper	classes,	and	many	













abandon	 the	whole	 experiment	 of	 building	 a	 nation,	 Morris	
was	 ready	 to	make	 the	 gamble	 that	 the	 people	were,	 in	 the	
words	 of	 his	 Preamble,	 prepared	 “to	 form	 a	 more	 perfect	
union.”21	
Morris’	 work	 resulted	 in	 the	 Constitution’s	 Preamble:	 “We	 the	




The	 Preamble	 encapsulates	 the	 Declaration’s	 essence—the	
preservation	 of	 liberty	 for	 all.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 facts,	 it	 can	 be	 fairly	
contended	 that	 the	Framers	wrote	a	Constitution	which	purported	 to	
secure	freedom	and	justice.	
Secondly,	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Declaration	 itself	 is	 broad	 enough	 to	
encompass	 recognition	 of	 freedom	 and	 equality	 for	 all	 (universal	
justice).	 When	 the	 Declaration	 used	 the	 term	 “men”	 in	 the	 late	
eighteenth	 century,	 “men”	 often	 referred	 to	 all	 humankind.23	 An	
important	 theme	 in	 this	 essay	 is	 that	 the	 Constitution	 must	 be	
interpreted	 to	 achieve	 the	 Framers’	 goals	 of	 universal	 freedom	 and	
equality.	 That	 argument	 does	 not	 depend	 upon	 the	 flawed	 practical	
behavior	of	 the	Framers	(and	 those	of	us	who	 follow	their	 footsteps).	
According	 to	 the	 Founders,	 America	 stands	 on	 the	 solid	 ethical	 and	




the	 inhabitant	 of	 Georgia	 and	 South	 Carolina	 who	 goes	 to	 the	 coast	 of	 Africa	 and,	 in	
defiance	of	the	most	sacred	laws	of	humanity,	tears	away	his	fellow	creatures	from	their	
dearest	connections	and	damns	them	to	the	most	cruel	bondages,	shall	have	more	votes	in	







	 23.	 See	 Man,	 SAMUEL	 JOHNSON,	 A	 DICTIONARY	 OF	 THE	 ENGLISH	 LANGUAGE,	
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/man-noun/	(last	updated	Jan.	5,	2013).	The	first	definition	





In	 practical	 terms,	 universal	 freedom	 and	 equality	 depend	 upon	
treating	all	others	with	respect—that	is,	as	we	wish	to	be	treated.	
Moreover,	 this	more	 expansive	 vision	 of	 freedom	and	 equality—
treating	 all	 others	with	 respect—emerged	 from	 the	 Second	American	
Revolution.	 That	 Revolution	 was	 the	 American	 Civil	 War,	 which	
resulted	in	the	destruction	of	chattel	slavery	and	the	creation	of	a	new,	
amended	 American	 Constitution.25	 Central	 to	 the	 new	 Constitution	 is	
the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	which	specifies	that	every	person	in	every	
state	 in	 the	 United	 States	 is	 entitled	 to	 have	 legal	 protection	 for	 her	
rights	 of	 Due	 Process	 and	 Equal	 Protection	 of	 the	 laws.26	 The	
Fourteenth	Amendment,	particularly	 its	Equal	Protection	Clause,	 is	an	
explicit	 statement	 of	 an	 implicit	 premise—namely,	 that	 in	 the	
interpretation	and	application	of	the	laws,	all	persons	are	to	be	treated	
as	legal	decision	makers	themselves	would	wish	to	be	treated.	
Moreover,	 ABA	 Resolution	 112A	 exemplifies	 the	 Framers’	
expressly	articulated	values	of	liberty	and	justice	for	all.	The	Resolution	














(1988)	 (discussing	 the	Civil	War,	 its	 impact	on	American	society,	 and	 the	 limited	steps	 towards	











In	 Gideon	 v.	 Wainwright,28	 defendant	 Clarence	 Earl	 Gideon	 was	





At	 trial,	 Gideon	 represented	 himself	 by	 making	 an	 opening	
statement,	cross-examining	witnesses,	presenting	witnesses,	and	in	his	
closing	 argument,	 emphasizing	 that	 he	 was	 innocent.	 The	 jury	
convicted	him,	and	Gideon	was	sentenced	to	a	five-year	prison	term	in	
the	state	penitentiary.31	
Subsequently,	Gideon	 filed	a	writ	of	habeas	corpus	 in	 the	Florida	
Supreme	Court.	The	 state	 supreme	court	denied	Gideon’s	petition	 for	
relief.32	 On	 appeal	 to	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court,	 the	 Court	
appointed	 a	 lawyer	 to	 represent	 Gideon.33	 The	 Court	 also	 requested	
that	counsel	for	both	sides	argue	whether	the	Court	should	reconsider	
its	holding	in	Betts	v.	Brady.34	
The	 Gideon	 Court	 said	 that	 the	 facts	 of	Betts	 were	 so	 similar	 to	
those	 in	 Gideon	 that	 if	 Betts	 were	 correctly	 decided,	 Gideon’s	 claim	
would	fail.35	 In	analyzing	Betts,	 the	Gideon	Court	stated	that	the	Court	
accepted	 “Betts	 v.	 Brady’s	 assumption,	 based	 as	 it	 was	 on	 our	 prior	
cases,	 that	a	provision	of	 the	Bill	of	Rights	which	 is	 ‘fundamental	and	
essential	 to	 a	 fair	 trial’	 is	 made	 obligatory	 upon	 the	 States	 by	 the	
Fourteenth	Amendment.”36	 The	Gideon	 Court	 ruled	 that	 “the	 Court	 in	















Writing	 for	 the	 Court’s	 majority,	 Justice	 Black	 said	 that	 “reason	
and	reflection	require	us	to	recognize	that	 in	our	adversary	system	of	
criminal	justice,	any	person	haled	into	court,	who	is	too	poor	to	hire	a	
lawyer,	 cannot	 be	 assured	 a	 fair	 trial	 unless	 counsel	 is	 provided	 for	
him.	This	seems	to	us	to	be	an	obvious	truth.”38	
While	Gideon	expressly	relied	on	the	Sixth	Amendment	as	applied	
to	 the	 states	 through	 the	 Due	 Process	 Clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment,	Gideon	also	specifically	noted	that	the	Constitution	seeks	
to	 ensure	 that	 “every	 defendant	 stands	 equal	 before	 the	 law.”39	 The	
Court	emphasized	that	“[t]his	noble	ideal	cannot	be	realized	if	the	poor	
man	charged	with	 crime	has	 to	 face	his	 accusers	without	 a	 lawyer	 to	
assist	 him.”40	 Stated	 differently,	 the	 Court	 recognized	 that	 infused	 in	
the	 right	 to	 counsel	 in	 criminal	 trials	 is	 an	 implicit	 equal	 protection	
component.	 The	 Gideon	 Court	 did	 not	 elaborate	 upon	 the	 equal	
protection	 basis	 for	 its	 holding.	 The	 Court	 simply	 outlined	 an	 equal	
protection	 rationale	 as	 fundamental	 to	 its	 ruling.	 In	 criminal	
proceedings,	 Gideon	 recognized	 that	 fairness	 and	 equality	 under	 the	
law	are	interrelated,	essential	safeguards	to	protect	individual	liberty.	
To	 be	 sure,	 Gideon	 dealt	 with	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 in	 criminal	
proceedings.	The	Court	said	nothing	about	the	constitutional	basis	for	a	
right	to	counsel	in	civil	proceedings.	Accordingly,	this	Article	considers	
the	 question	 of	 whether	 anything	 in	 the	 Constitution	 expressly	




First,	 this	 Article	 considers	 in	 more	 detail	 an	 appropriate	
methodology	 for	 interpreting	 the	 Constitution,	 especially	 relevant	
constitutional	 provisions	 supporting	 a	 civil	 right	 to	 counsel	 in	












	 We	 confront	 the	 initial	 question	 of	 what	 this	 Article	 means	
when	 it	uses	 the	word	“interpret.”	A	working	definition	of	 “interpret”	
for	 purposes	 of	 this	 Article	 is	 drawn	 from	 the	 Oxford	 English	
Dictionary:	 “[t]o	 expound	 the	 meaning	 of	 (something	 abstruse	 or	
mysterious);	 to	 render	 (words,	 writings,	 an	 author,	 etc.)	 clear	 or	
explicit;	 to	 elucidate;	 to	 explain.”42	 In	 plain	 language,	 in	 this	 Article,	
	
	 42.	 Interpret,	 OXFORD	 ENGLISH	 DICTIONARY,	 https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/	
98205?rskey=L9XL2b&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid	 (last	visited	Nov.	26,	2019)	 (available	by	
subscription).	 Other	 theories	 of	 knowledge	 cover	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 including	 classical	 Greek	
thought	as	reflected	in	Plato’s	Theaetetus:	
	

































History,	 82	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	 641	 (2013)	and	Professors	Randy	E.	Barnett	&	Evan	D.	Bernick,	No	




“interpret”	 means	 an	 attempt	 to	 explain	 as	 clearly	 and	 logically	 as	
possible	what	the	words	of	a	text	mean.	The	particular	text	upon	which	
the	Article	 focuses	 is	the	Constitution	of	the	United	States	of	America.	
In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 Article	 to	 parse	 and	
explore	 the	 innumerable	 permutations,	 nuances,	 and	 possible	
alternative	explanations	of	“interpret.”	That	could	be	the	focus	of	many	
volumes.	To	reduce	the	ambiguity	inherent	in	this	language,	this	Article	
simply	 attempts	 to	 communicate	 sufficiently	 clearly	 what	 interpret	
means	here.	
With	that	said,	the	Article	now	considers	how	to	best	interpret	the	
Constitution.	 To	 facilitate	 analysis,	 a	 brief	 review	 of	 some	




following	 overview	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 be	 an	 exhaustive	 discussion	 of	




In	McCulloch,	 the	United	 States	 government	 chartered	 a	 national	
bank	 to	 facilitate	 financial	 transactions	 on	 a	 federal	 level	 and	 to	
circumvent	 some	 parochial	 challenges	 associated	 with	 state	 banks.45	
After	the	creation	of	the	national	bank,	the	Commonwealth	of	Maryland	
subsequently	 passed	 legislation	 that	 imposed	 a	 $15,000	 tax	 on	 non-
Maryland	banks	doing	business	 in	Maryland.	 J.W.	McCulloch,	a	 federal	




ed.	 2018);	 CHARLES	 L.	 BLACK,	 JR.,	 A	NEW	 BIRTH	 OF	 FREEDOM:	HUMAN	 RIGHTS	NAMED	 AND	 UNNAMED	








tax.47	 On	 appeal	 to	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court,	 the	 Court	
unanimously	overturned	the	state	court	decision.48	
The	 McCulloch	 Court	 considered	 several	 approaches	 to	
constitutional	analysis.	
a.	Precedent	
The	 Court	 began	 by	 evaluating	 existing	 precedent.	 The	 Court	
emphasized	that	Congress	had	previously	enacted	legislation	creating	a	
national	 bank.49	 However,	 the	 Court	 said	 that	 Congress	 later	 allowed	
the	 legislation	 to	 lapse.50	 Once	 the	 legislation	 expired	 and	 the	 Bank	
ceased	to	exist,	the	nation	suffered	negative	experiences	because	of	the	
absence	 of	 a	 financial	 institution	 capable	 of	 funding	 vital	 national	
projects.	 Accordingly,	 Congress	 reestablished	 a	 national	 bank.51	
Regarding	 historical	 precedent,	 the	 Court	 stated:	 “The	 principle	 now	
contested	 was	 introduced	 at	 a	 very	 early	 period	 of	 our	 history,	 has	




Not	 only	 did	McCulloch	 appeal	 to	 precedent,	 but	 that	 case	 also	
discussed	 the	 interplay	 of	 constitutional	 text	 and	 structure	
(governmental	 architecture).	 For	 instance,	 the	 Court	 addressed	 the	
structural	issue	of	whether	the	Constitution	was	a	creation	of	the	States	
or	 of	 the	 people.	 The	 Court’s	 rationale	 included	 reliance	 upon	 the	
words	 of	 the	 Preamble:	 “We	 the	 People	 of	 the	 United	 States	.	.	.	 do	
ordain	 and	 establish	 this	 Constitution	 for	 the	 United	 States	 of	
America.”53	 The	 Court	 stated	 that	 in	 creating	 the	 Constitution,	 the	
people	of	the	United	States	met	in	conventions	and	established	a	legal	













According	 to	McCulloch,	 the	 national	 government	 possessed	 the	
authority	 to	 create	 a	 national	 bank	 based	 upon	 the	 words	 of	 the	
Constitution	and	the	structural	relationship—that	is,	the	governmental	





declare	 and	 conduct	 a	 war;	 and	 to	 raise	 and	 support	 armies	 and	
navies.	The	sword	and	the	purse,	all	 the	external	relations,	and	no	
inconsiderable	portion	of	 the	 industry	of	 the	nation,	are	entrusted	
to	its	government.	.	.	.	[I]t	may	with	great	reason	be	contended,	that	
a	 government,	 entrusted	 with	 such	 ample	 powers,	 on	 the	 due	




presumed	 to	 have	 been	 their	 intention,	 to	 clog	 and	 embarrass	 its	
execution	by	withholding	the	most	appropriate	means.55	
Thus,	 the	 Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 national	 government	 could	
establish	 a	 national	 bank	 because	 the	 Framers	 created	 a	 constitution	
that	 would	 authorize	 the	 national	 government	 to	 achieve	 ambitious	
national	 goals	 like	 regulating	 commerce	 and	 conducting	 wars.56	
Accordingly,	 the	 lack	 of	 specific	 constitutional	 language	 allowing	 the	
incorporation	 of	 a	 national	 bank	 was	 not	 fatal	 to	 the	 claim	 that	
Congress	had	power	to	create	such	a	financial	institution.	
Again,	 appealing	 to	 the	 governmental	 architecture	 of	 the	
Constitution,	McCulloch	said:	
A	constitution,	to	contain	an	accurate	detail	of	all	the	subdivisions	of	
which	 its	 great	 powers	will	 admit,	 and	 of	 all	 the	means	 by	which	
they	may	be	carried	into	execution,	would	partake	of	the	prolixity	of	
a	legal	code,	and	could	scarcely	be	embraced	by	the	human	mind.	It	








important	 objects	 designated,	 and	 the	 minor	 ingredients	 which	
compose	 those	objects,	 be	deduced	 from	 the	nature	of	 the	objects	
themselves.	 That	 this	 idea	 was	 entertained	 by	 the	 framers	 of	 the	
American	constitution,	is	not	only	to	be	inferred	from	the	nature	of	
the	 instrument,	 but	 from	 the	 language.	.	.	.	 [W]e	must	 never	 forget	
that	it	is	a	constitution	we	are	expounding.57	
c.	Legislative	History	(and	Precedent	Again)	
McCulloch	 countered	 the	 argument	 that	 Congress	 exceeded	 its	
authority	 because	 the	 Constitution	 did	 not	 expressly	 provide	 for	 the	
creation	of	a	national	bank.	The	Court	responded	to	opponents’	textual	
objections	 by	 returning	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 precedent	 as	 well	 as	 other	
provisions	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Constitution.	 Specifically,	 the	 Court	
reviewed	part	of	the	Constitution’s	drafting	history	and	contrasted	the	
Constitution	with	its	predecessor,	the	Articles	of	Confederation.	Unlike	
the	 Articles,	 the	 Constitution	 did	 not	 say	 that	 national	 governmental	





The	 Court	 focused	 attention	 upon	 the	 Tenth	 Amendment,	 which	
left	 out	 the	 word	 expressly.	 The	 Court	 explained	 the	 significance	 of	
omitting	expressly	as	follows:	




the	 States,	 are	 reserved	 to	 the	 States	 or	 to	 the	people;’	 thus	
leaving	 the	 question,	 whether	 the	 particular	 power	 which	
may	become	the	subject	of	contest	has	been	delegated	to	the	








The	 Framers	 could	 have	 written	 the	 Amendment	 as	 follows:	 “The	
powers	not	expressly	delegated	to	the	United	States	by	the	Constitution	
nor	 prohibited	 by	 it	 to	 the	 States,	 are	 reserved	 to	 the	 States	
respectively	or	 to	 the	people.”	The	Framers	chose	 to	omit	 “expressly”	
leaving	us	with	the	text	as	it	exists	now.	The	Tenth	Amendment	simply	
says:	 “The	 powers	 not	 delegated	 to	 the	 United	 States	 by	 the	
Constitution,	 nor	 prohibited	 by	 it	 to	 the	 States,	 are	 reserved	 to	 the	
States	respectively,	or	to	the	people.”60	
d.	A	Holistic	Interpretative	Approach	
The	 Court’s	 analysis	 drew	 not	 only	 upon	 precedent,	 textual	
analysis,	 and	 structure,	 but	 also	 upon	 prudential	 concerns	 regarding	
how	 to	 read	 the	 text.	 According	 to	 McCulloch,	 constitutional	
interpretation	 must	 depend	 upon	 a	 “fair	 construction	 of	 the	 whole	
instrument,”61	not	upon	cherry	picking	disconnected	parts.	
In	 addition,	 the	 Court	 emphasized	 that	 the	 Constitution’s	
provisions	are	subject	to	differing	interpretations,	which	may	vary	over	




is	 a	 constitution	 we	 are	 expounding,”63	 Marshall	 recognized	 that	
constitutional	 texts	 must	 be	 read	 as	 judges	 read	 the	 common	 law—
carefully	 examining	 the	 facts,	 precedent,	 text,	 structure,	 prudential	
concerns,	 and	 other	 relevant	 factors.	 Repeating	 for	 emphasis,	 the	
purpose	of	such	analysis	is	to	deduce	“a	fair	construction	of	the	whole	
instrument.”64	
In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 in	 his	 classic	 text	 on	 expounding	human	 rights	
under	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution,	 Professor	 Charles	 L.	 Black,	 Jr.	
said:	 “The	methods	of	 law	are	not	a	closed	canon.	The	problems	 they	










conviction	 that	 some	 solutions,	 though	 confidently	 arrived	 at,	 were	
wrong,	and	must	be	revised.”65	
Professor	 Ronald	 Dworkin	 championed	 a	 similar	 approach.	 He	
suggested	 that	 judges	 should	 adopt	 a	 natural	 law	 informed	
methodology	 (“naturalism”)	 in	 deciding	 cases,	 and	 that	 such	 an	
adjudicatory	 process	 could	 be	 analogized	 to	 writing	 a	 chain	 novel.	
Dworkin	writes:	
[C]ommon	 law	 adjudication	 is	 a	 chain	 enterprise.	.	.	.	 According	 to	
naturalism,	 a	 judge	 should	 decide	 fresh	 cases	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 a	
novelist	 in	the	chain	writing	a	fresh	chapter.	The	judge	must	make	
creative	decisions,	but	must	 try	 to	make	 these	decisions	 “going	on	
as	before”	rather	than	by	starting	in	a	new	direction	as	if	writing	on	
a	 clean	 slate.	 He	 must	 read	 through	 (or	 have	 some	 good	 idea	
through	his	legal	training	and	experience)	what	other	judges	in	the	
past	have	written,	 not	 simply	 to	discover	what	 these	other	 judges	
have	said,	or	their	state	of	mind	when	they	said	it,	but	to	reach	an	
opinion	 about	what	 they	 have	 collectively	 done.	.	.	.	 Of	 course,	 the	
best	 interpretation	 of	 past	 judicial	 decisions	 is	 the	 interpretation	
that	shows	these	in	the	best	light,	not	aesthetically	but	politically,	as	
coming	 as	 close	 to	 the	 correct	 ideals	 of	 a	 just	 legal	 system	 as	
possible.	 Judges	 in	 the	 chain	of	 law	share	with	 the	 chain	novelists	
the	imperative	of	interpretation,	but	they	bring	different	standards	
of	 success—political	 rather	 than	 aesthetic—to	 bear	 on	 that	
enterprise.66	
Dworkin’s	 approach	 resembles	 Marshall’s	 in	 McCulloch	 in	 that	
Marshall	emphasized:	
[The	Constitution’s]	 nature,	 therefore,	 requires,	 that	 only	 its	 great	
outlines	 should	 be	 marked,	 its	 important	 objects	 designated,	 and	
the	 minor	 ingredients	 which	 compose	 those	 objects,	 be	 deduced	
from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 objects	 themselves.	 That	 this	 idea	 was	
entertained	by	the	framers	of	the	American	constitution,	is	not	only	
to	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 instrument,	 but	 from	 the	
language.67	








in	 principles	 of	 political	 morality	.	.	.	 from	 the	 most	 profound	
constitutional	rules	and	arrangements	to	the	details	of,	for	example,	the	
private	 law	 of	 tort	 or	 contract.”68	 For	 purposes	 of	 this	 analysis,	 in	
interpreting	the	Constitution,	“the	important	objects,”	to	use	Marshall’s	
words,69	also	can	reflect	what	Dworkin	calls	“the	political	structure	of	
[a]	 community.”70	 Dworkin	 and	Marshall	 both	 seek	 the	 best	 outcome	
given	the	structure	of	the	legal	system	within	which	they	are	operating.	
Dworkin’s	 focus	 on	 “the	 best	 justification	.	.	.	 in	 principles	 of	
political	 morality,	 for	 the	 structure	 as	 a	 whole”71	 means	 that	
interpretation	of	 the	Constitution	must	 consider	 values	 like	universal	
liberty	 and	 justice	 proclaimed	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence.	
Specifically,	 it	 states:	 “We	hold	 these	 truths	 to	be	self-evident,	 that	all	
men	 are	 created	 equal,	 that	 they	 are	 endowed	 by	 their	 Creator	with	
certain	unalienable	Rights,	 that	among	 these	are	Life,	Liberty	and	 the	
pursuit	 of	 Happiness.”72	 Likewise,	 the	 Constitution	 should	 be	 read	 to	
reinforce	 the	 Declaration’s	 affirmation	 that	 the	 government	 is	





a	 New	 Year’s	 Day	 note	 to	 himself	 as	 he	 prepared	 to	 assume	 the	
presidency	 of	 a	 fracturing	 Union.	 In	 the	 following	 words,	 Lincoln	
summarized	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	Declaration’s	 proclamation	
of	freedom	and	the	Constitution’s	protection	of	liberty:	
There	 is	 something	 back	 of	 these,	 entwining	 itself	 more	 closely	
about	the	human	heart.	That	something,	is	the	principle	of	“Liberty	
to	 all”—the	 principle	 that	 clears	 the	 path	 for	 all—gives	 hope		 to	
all—and,	by	consequence,	enterprize,		and	industry	to	all.	










The	 assertion	 of	 that	principle,	 at	that	 time,	 was	the	word,	 “fitly	
spoken”	which	has	proved	an	 “apple	of	gold”	 to	us.	The	Union,	 and	
the	Constitution,	 are	 the	picture	of	silver,	 subsequently	 framed	
around	 it.	 The	 picture	 was	 made,	 not	 to	conceal,	 or	destroy	the	









Such	 an	 approach	 has	 global	 implications.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	
similar	 international	 key,	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	
Africa	expressly	incorporates	a	human-rights-friendly	approach	into	its	
interpretive	framework.	Section	1(a)	of	Article	39	of	the	South	African	
Constitution	 states:	 “When	 interpreting	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights,	 a	 court,	
tribunal	or	forum	must	promote	the	values	that	underlie	an	open	and	
democratic	 society	 based	 on	 human	 dignity,	 equality	 and	 freedom.”76	
Thus,	 in	 South	 Africa,	 political	 morality,	 democracy,	 human	 dignity,	
equality,	 and	 freedom	 must	 all	 be	 central	 to	 constitutional	
interpretation.	
Last	 for	 our	 purposes,	 but	 certainly	 not	 least,	 the	 Constitution	
provides	 for	 separation	 of	 powers	 among	 three	 co-equal	 branches.	
Thus,	 interpreters	 also	 need	 to	 consider	 how	 other	 branches	 of	 the	
government	 have	 comprehended	 the	 particular	 constitutional	
provision(s).77	To	 facilitate	 unity	 of	 purpose	 in	 promoting	 the	 public	
interest,	governmental	decision	makers	in	each	branch	should	give	due	
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deference	 to	 how	 other	 branches	 articulate	 the	 Constitution	whether	
through	legislation,	judicial	decision,	or	executive	administration.	




provisions	 regarding	 a	 right	 to	 court-appointed	 counsel	 in	 civil	
adversarial	 cases.	 We	 begin	 with	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment,	 and	 then	




We	begin	with	a	 textual	analysis	of	 the	Sixth	Amendment:	 “In	all	
criminal	prosecutions,	the	accused	shall	enjoy	the	right	to	.	.	.	have	the	
Assistance	 of	 Counsel	 for	 his	 defence.”80	 The	 Sixth	 Amendment	 does	
not	 say	 that	 the	 right	 to	 the	 assistance	 of	 counsel	 is	 limited	 only	 to	
criminal	prosecutions.	Nor	does	 the	Amendment	expressly	 limit	 itself	
exclusively	or	solely	 to	criminal	prosecutions.	The	Framers	could	have	
said:	“In	only	Criminal	prosecutions	the	accused	shall	enjoy	the	right	to	
have	 the	 assistance	 of	 counsel	 for	 his	 defense.”	Or	 “solely	 in	 Criminal	
prosecutions	the	accused	shall	enjoy	the	right	to	have	the	assistance	of	
counsel	 for	his	defense.”	Likewise,	 they	could	have	stated,	 “exclusively	
in	Criminal	prosecutions	 the	accused	shall	enjoy	 the	right	 to	have	 the	
assistance	of	counsel	for	his	defense.”	While	the	Framers	were	free	to	
expressly	 limit	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 counsel	 only,	 solely,	 or	
exclusively	 to	 federal	 criminal	 prosecutions,	 the	 text	 does	 not	
unequivocally	do	so.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 certainly	 true	 that	 one	 possible	
interpretation	of	the	Sixth	Amendment	is	that	the	Amendment	applies	
only,	solely,	and	exclusively	to	criminal	prosecutions.	In	the	recent	case	









contempt	 child	 custody	 proceeding,	 the	 Court	 said	 that	 “the	 Sixth	
Amendment	 does	 not	 govern	 civil	 cases.”82	 We	 will	 come	 back	 to	 a	
more	 complete	 analysis	 of	 that	 overly	 restrictive	 judicial	 gloss	 of	 the	
Sixth	Amendment	momentarily.	
In	 the	 meantime,	 this	 Article	 argues	 that	 a	 better	 approach	 to	
understanding	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 would	 be	 to	 read	 the	 Sixth	





Fifth	 Amendment’s	 Due	 Process	 Clause,	 which	 says	 that	 “No	 person	
shall	be	.	.	.	deprived	of	life,	liberty,	or	property,	without	due	process	of	
law.”83	 The	Amendment	 contemplates	 that	 each	person	has	 a	 right	 to	
Due	 Process—that	 is	 a	 fair	 process—in	 all	 circumstances	 where	 the	
person	 is	 in	 jeopardy	of	 losing	her	 life	or	 freedom	or	property.	Again,	
the	 text	 is	 key.	 The	words	 of	 the	 Fifth	 Amendment	 literally	 embrace	
both	criminal	and	civil	federal	cases.	
The	 same	 is	 true	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment’s	 Due	 Process	
Clause,	 which	 applies	 to	 the	 States.	 The	 Amendment	 says	 that	 “[n]o	
State	 shall	.	.	.	 deprive	 any	person	of	 life,	 liberty,	 or	 property,	without	
due	process	of	 law.”84	The	Fourteenth	Amendment	 is	 silent	 regarding	
whether	 its	 Due	 Process	 Clause	 applies	 only	 to	 civil	 cases,	 criminal	
cases,	or	both.	
Ratified	three	years	following	the	close	of	the	American	Civil	War,	
the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment’s	 Due	 Process	 Clause	 was	 designed	 to	
alleviate	the	oppression	of	African	Americans	subjected	to	Black	Codes	
and	 other	 nefarious	 legal	 devices	 fashioned	 by	 ex-confederates	 and	
their	sympathizers	who	sought	to	create	conditions	as	close	to	slavery	





	 85.	 Slaughter-House	 Cases,	 83	 U.S.	 (16	 Wall.)	 36,	 71	 (1873);	 ERIC	 FONER,	 RECONSTRUCTION:	
AMERICA’S	UNFINISHED	REVOLUTION:	 1863–1877,	 at	 119–23	 (1988);	 1	 SAMUEL	 ELIOT	MORISON,	 THE	
OXFORD	HISTORY	OF	 THE	AMERICAN	PEOPLE:	1789–1877	 (1972);	VA.	WRITERS	PROGRAM	OF	 THE	WORK	
PROJECTS	ADMIN.	OF	THE	STATE	OF	VA.,	THE	NEGRO	IN	VIRGINIA	226	(1940).	Much	of	this	analysis	of	the	




decided	 eight	 years	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	War,	 the	 Court	 analyzed	 the	
Thirteenth,	Fourteenth,	and	Fifteenth	Amendments	to	the	Constitution.	
The	Court	stated:	
[N]o	one	can	 fail	 to	be	 impressed	with	 the	one	pervading	purpose	
found	in	them	all,	lying	at	the	foundation	of	each,	and	without	which	
none	 of	 them	 would	 have	 been	 even	 suggested;	 we	 mean	 the	
freedom	 of	 the	 slave	 race,	 the	 security	 and	 firm	 establishment	 of	
that	 freedom,	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 newly-made	 freeman	 and	
citizen	 from	 the	oppressions	of	 those	who	had	 formerly	 exercised	
unlimited	dominion	over	him.87	
By	 saying	 that	 the	Constitution	 safeguarded	 the	 rights	 of	African	
Americans,	 the	Court	 took	a	giant	step	 forward	compared	to	the	Dred	




Court	 contended	 that	 the	 national	 rights	 of	 citizens	 were	 extremely	
limited.	For	example,	national	citizenship	rights	encompassed	the	right	
to	petition	the	government	to	change	its	policies,	to	have	the	assistance	
of	 the	 national	 government	 if	 the	 citizen	were	 in	 trouble	 on	 the	 high	
seas	or	with	a	foreign	government,	and	to	move	freely	from	one	state	to	
another.	 In	contrast	to	puny	national	citizenship	rights,	 the	Slaughter-
House	 Court	 said	 that	 the	 states	 controlled	most	meaningful	 rights	 of	
citizenship.89	 In	 this	respect,	 the	Slaughter-House	Court’s	analysis	was	
problematic	 because	 throughout	 the	 post-Civil	 War	 South,	 state	
governments	were	 increasingly	dominated	by	 ex-confederates	hostile	
to	 African	 Americans	 exercising	 their	 freedom	 on	 equal	 terms	 with	
whites.	
In	Strauder	v.	West	Virginia,90	decided	seven	years	after	Slaughter-
















ordains	 that	 no	 State	 shall	make	 or	 enforce	 any	 laws	which	 shall	
abridge	 the	 privileges	 or	 immunities	 of	 citizens	 of	 the	 United	
States.	.	.	.	 It	 ordains	 that	 no	 State	 shall	 deprive	 any	 person	 of	 life,	
liberty,	 or	 property,	 without	 due	 process	 of	 law,	 or	 deny	 to	 any	
person	within	its	jurisdiction	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.	What	
is	this	but	declaring	that	the	law	in	the	States	shall	be	the	same	for	
the	 black	 as	 for	 the	 white;	 that	 all	 persons,	 whether	 colored	 or	
white,	shall	stand	equal	before	the	laws	of	the	States,	and,	in	regard	
to	 the	 colored	 race,	 for	 whose	 protection	 the	 amendment	 was	
primarily	 designed,	 that	 no	 discrimination	 shall	 be	 made	 against	
them	by	 law	because	of	 their	color?	The	words	of	 the	amendment	
[while	 prohibitory]	 contain	 a	 necessary	 implication	 of	 a	 positive	
immunity,	or	right,	most	valuable	to	the	colored	race,—the	right	to	
exemption	from	unfriendly	legislation	against	them	distinctively	as	
colored,—exemption	 from	 legal	 discriminations,	 implying	
inferiority	in	civil	society,	lessening	the	security	of	their	enjoyment	
of	 the	 rights	 which	 others	 enjoy,	 and	 discriminations	 which	 are	
steps	towards	reducing	them	to	the	condition	of	a	subject	race.92	
Despite	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment	 and	 the	Strauder	
Court’s	constructive	modes	of	clarifying	its	meaning,	in	later	cases	the	
Court	 read	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 too	 narrowly.	 For	 example,	
three	 years	 after	 Strauder,	 in	 the	 Civil	 Rights	 Cases,93	 the	 Court	
retreated	from	the	Constitution’s	promise	of	liberty	and	justice	for	all.	




















have	been	easier	 for	 the	proverbial	 “camel	 to	go	 through	 the	eye	of	a	
needle”95	 than	 for	 a	 person	 of	 color	 to	 prove	 unconstitutional	 race	
discrimination—especially	 in	 public	 spaces.	 The	 Court	 subverted	 the	
Amendment	 to	 allow	 race	 discrimination	 to	 flourish	 in	most	 areas	 of	
American	 civic	 life.96	 The	 Court’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Amendment	




Justice	 Harlan	 spoke	 eloquently	 against	 the	 decision	 of	 the	
majority	to	gut	the	rights	of	the	newly	freed	blacks:	
[T]he	 national	 legislature	may,	 without	 transcending	 the	 limits	 of	
the	Constitution,	do	for	human	liberty	and	the	fundamental	rights	of	
American	citizenship,	what	it	did,	with	the	sanction	of	this	court,	for	
the	 protection	 of	 slavery	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 the	masters	 of	 fugitive	
slaves.	If	fugitive	slave	laws	.	.	.	whereby	the	master	could	seize	and	
recover	 his	 fugitive	 slave,	were	 legitimate	 exercises	 of	 an	 implied	
power	to	protect	and	enforce	a	right	recognized	by	the	Constitution,	
why	shall	the	hands	of	Congress	be	tied,	so	that—under	an	express	
power	.	.	.	 to	 enforce	 a	 constitutional	 provision	 granting	
citizenship—it	 may	 not,	 by	.	.	.	 direct	 legislation,	 bring	 the	 whole	
power	of	this	nation	to	bear	upon	States	and	their	officers,	and	upon	
such	 individuals	 and	 corporations	 exercising	 public	 functions	 as	






















a	 fair-skinned	 African	 American.99	 According	 to	 court	 records,	 Plessy	
looked	 like	a	white	person.	Plessy	wanted	 to	have	 the	 local	Louisiana	
segregation	statutes	overturned	because	 they	violated	 the	Fourteenth	
Amendment’s	 provision	 that	 every	 person	 in	 the	 United	 States	 is	
entitled	to	equal	protection	of	the	laws.	Plessy	was	arrested	for	riding	
in	the	whites-only	section	in	a	Louisiana	railway	car.100	
Plessy	 filed	 suit	 challenging	 the	 local	 segregation	 statutes.	 In	 an	
eight-to-one	 decision,	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	 ruled	 against	
him.	The	Court	held	that	the	state’s	statutes	were	not	unreasonable.101	
The	 Court	 said	 that	 if	 the	 segregation	 statutes	 discriminated	 in	 a	
demeaning	manner,	the	problem	was	primarily	in	the	minds	of	blacks	
who	chose	to	look	at	the	statutes	in	that	way.	The	majority	stated:	
We	 consider	 the	 underlying	 fallacy	 of	 the	 plaintiff’s	 argument	 to	
consist	 in	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 enforced	 separation	 of	 the	 two	
races	stamps	the	colored	race	with	a	badge	of	inferiority.	If	this	be	
so,	 it	 is	 not	 by	 reason	 of	 anything	 found	 in	 the	 act,	 but	 solely	
because	 the	 colored	 race	 chooses	 to	 put	 that	 construction	 upon	
it.102	
Based	 on	 this	 tortured	 logic,	 the	 Court	 ruled	 that	 the	 segregation	
statutes	did	not	violate	the	Fourteenth	Amendment’s	Equal	Protection	
Clause.	
In	 his	 dissent,	 Justice	 Harlan	 argued	 that	 the	 real	 impact	 of	 the	
segregation	 statutes	 was	 that	 blacks	 were	 perceived	 as	 being	 so	
debased	 and	 inferior	 that	 they	were	 not	 free	 to	 associate	with	white	
citizens:	
Sixty	millions	of	whites	are	in	no	danger	from	the	presence	here	of	
eight	 millions	 of	 blacks.	 The	 destinies	 of	 the	 two	 races,	 in	 this	
country,	are	 indissolubly	 linked	together,	and	the	 interests	of	both	












more	 certainly	 arouse	 race	 hate,	 what	 more	 certainly	 create	 and	
perpetuate	 a	 feeling	 of	 distrust	 between	 these	 races,	 than	 state	
enactments,	 which,	 in	 fact,	 proceed	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 colored	
citizens	are	so	inferior	and	degraded	that	they	cannot	be	allowed	to	
sit	 in	 public	 coaches	 occupied	 by	 white	 citizens?	 That,	 as	 all	 will	
admit,	 is	 the	 real	 meaning	 of	 such	 legislation	 as	 was	 enacted	 in	
Louisiana.103	
Section	5	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	conferred	upon	Congress	
plenary	 authority	 to	 alleviate	 color-	 and	 caste-based	 discrimination:	
“Congress	shall	have	power	 to	enforce,	by	appropriate	 legislation,	 the	
provisions	 of	 this	 article.”104	 As	 the	 Court	 recognized	 two	 hundred	
years	ago	 in	McCulloch	v.	Maryland,105	 the	Constitution	 is	 a	document	
“intended	to	endure	for	ages	to	come,	and,	consequently,	to	be	adapted	
to	the	various	crises	of	human	affairs.”106	
Accordingly,	 in	 cases	 like	 Plessy,	 the	 Court	 could	 have	 upheld	
Congress’	plenary	power	and	expounded	the	Constitution	on	a	case-by-
case	 common	 law	 basis	 to	 blaze	 a	 freedom	 trail	 for	 vulnerable	
members	 of	 American	 society.	 Through	 a	 liberal	 interpretation	 and	
application	of	the	substantive	provisions	of	Section	1	of	the	Fourteenth	




law.	 The	 Court’s	 hostile	 interpretative	 analysis	 led	 to	 unfortunate	
consequences	 for	 race	 discrimination	 victims	 as	 well	 as	 the	 broad	
landscape	of	American	human	rights	jurisprudence.	
When	 the	 Court	 abdicated	 its	 responsibility	 to	 protect	 the	
constitutional	 rights	 of	 societal	 outcasts,	 the	 Court	 confronted	 an	
important	theoretical	and	practical	problem:	how	to	protect	the	human	
rights	 outlined	 in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 from	 oppressive	 state	 laws	 and	
policies.	The	Court’s	response	to	its	previous	missteps	was	the	creation	








contradictory”	 doctrine	 of	 substantive	 due	process.107	 In	 practice,	 the	
courts	have	used	this	doctrine	to	buttress	the	conclusion	that	most	of	
the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 apply	 to	 the	 states	 via	 the	 Due	
Process	 Clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment.108	 Professor	 Black	
summed	matters	up	in	these	words:	“The	‘due	process’	clause	is	being	
made	 to	 carry	 the	 load	 that	 would	 far	 more	 naturally	 have	 been	
assigned	 to	 the	 ‘privileges	 and	 immunities’	 clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment,	 jointly	 with	 the	 two	 ‘citizenship’	 clauses	 in	 that	
Amendment.”109	 Professor	 Black’s	 analysis	 neatly	 synthesizes	 the	
results	 of	 the	 Court	 having	 painted	 itself	 into	 a	 proverbial	
jurisprudential	corner.110	
So	far,	the	Article	has	contended	that	to	protect	liberty	and	justice	




And	what,	 if	 anything	 else,	 furnishes	 the	 constitutional	mandate	
for	 such	 an	 interpretation	 approach?	 So	 glad	 you	 asked:	 that	 is	 the	
essence	 of	 what	 the	 Framers	 required	 in	 the	 Ninth	 Amendment	 to	
which	we	now	turn.	
c.	The	Ninth	Amendment	
The	 Ninth	 Amendment	 states:	 “The	 enumeration	 in	 the	
Constitution,	 of	 certain	 rights,	 shall	 not	 be	 construed	 to	 deny	 or	
disparage	 others	 retained	 by	 the	 people.”112	 The	 text	 of	 the	 Ninth	
Amendment	 contemplates	 that	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 individuals	 have	
rights	which	are	not	enumerated	in	the	Constitution.	The	Constitution	
mandates	that	unenumerated	rights	are	to	be	recognized	and	protected	
to	 the	 same	extent	 as	 the	enumerated	 rights	outlined	elsewhere—for	
instance,	in	the	preceding	eight	Amendments.113	
	













Black	 and	 Dworkin	 illuminate	 proper	 interpretation	 of	 constitutional	
texts,	particularly	where	the	Framers	have	structured	the	Constitution	
to	 accomplish	 broad	 goals	 like	 providing	 a	 mechanism	 to	 finance	
national	 projects	 (McCulloch)114	 or	 protecting	 the	 rights	 of	 persons	
previously	 enslaved	 and	 tormented	 in	 barbaric	 circumstances	
(Strauder).115	Repeating	for	emphasis,	as	Chief	Justice	Marshall	said	in	
McCulloch:	
[A]	 government,	 [e]ntrusted	with	 such	 ample	 powers,	 on	 the	 due	
execution	 of	which	 the	 happiness	 and	 prosperity	 of	 the	 nation	 so	
vitally	 depends,	 must	 also	 be	 [e]ntrusted	 with	 ample	 means	 for	
their	 execution.	 The	 power	 being	 given,	 it	 is	 the	 interest	 of	 the	
nation	to	 facilitate	 its	execution.	 It	can	never	be	their	 interest,	and	
cannot	 be	 presumed	 to	 have	 been	 their	 intention,	 to	 clog	 and	
embarrass	 its	 execution	 by	 withholding	 the	 most	 appropriate	
means.116	
McCulloch	dealt	with	the	scope	of	national	governmental	power.	A	
similar	 interpretive	 approach	 is	 necessary	 to	 facilitate	 another	
important	 governmental	 objective:	 protecting	 individual	 liberty.	 A	




at	 the	 level	 of	magnitude	 proportioned	 to	 the	 problem.	 Insistence	
on	thinking	small	veils	the	largest	facts	from	view.	If	we	are	to	have	
a	 true	 system,	 a	 productive	 system	 of	 human	 rights,	 we	 have	 to	








	 117.	 BLACK,	 JR.,	 supra	 note	 43,	 at	 36;	 see	 also	 BENNETT	 B.	 PATTERSON,	 THE	 FORGOTTEN	 NINTH	
AMENDMENT:	A	CALL	 FOR	LEGISLATIVE	 AND	 JUDICIAL	RECOGNITION	 OF	RIGHTS	UNDER	SOCIAL	CONDITIONS	







Accordingly,	 the	 Constitution	 should	 be	 interpreted	 to	 facilitate	




3.	 Carefully	 evaluate	 the	 words	 of	 the	 text	 as	 well	 as	 how	 a	
particular	 decision	 would	 impact	 the	 existing	 constitutional	
structure;119	
4.	 Identify	 the	 values	 (“principles	 of	 political	 morality”)120	
espoused	in	the	Constitution	and	Declaration	of	Independence;	





Having	 argued	 for	 a	 human-rights-friendly	 method	 of	




HISTORY	 OF	 THE	 NINTH	 AMENDMENT	 82	 (2009)	 (“The	 text	 of	 the	 Ninth	 Amendment	 prevents	
interpretations	of	 enumerated	 rights	 that	negatively	 affect	 the	unenumerated	 retained	 rights	of	
the	 people.	 Neither	 unduly	 narrow	 nor	 excessively	 broad	 interpretations	 of	 enumerated	 rights	
violate	the	Ninth	Amendment	as	long	as	the	fact	of	enumeration	is	not	relied	upon	to	suggest	the	
necessity	 or	 superiority	 of	 enumeration.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 use	 the	 Ninth	 as	 implied	 or	 indirect	
support	for	general	theories	of	broad—or	narrow—constructions	of	enumerated	rights,	but	these	






(in	 the	 proposed	 Bill	 of	 Rights)	 or	 the	 ban	 on	 ex	 post	 facto	 law	 (in	 the	 original	 Constitution).	
Explicitly	 listing	 rights	 had	 advantages,	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 reassuring	 the	 public	 and	 stimulating	










owed	 child	 support.	 A	 South	Carolina	 state	 court	 ordered	him	 to	 pay	
the	arrearages.	When	Turner	failed	to	obey	the	court	order	to	pay,	the	










Amendment	 does	 not	 govern	 civil	 cases.”124	 The	 Turner	 Court	 also	
acknowledged	 that	 “[t]his	 Court	 has	 decided	 only	 a	 handful	 of	 cases	
that	more	directly	concern	a	right	 to	counsel	 in	civil	matters.	And	the	
application	of	those	decisions	to	the	present	case	is	not	clear.”125	After	
reviewing	 pertinent	 cases,	 the	 Turner	 Court	 concluded	 that	 its	 prior	
cases	 “had	 found	 a	 right	 to	 counsel	 ‘only’	 in	 [civil]	 cases	 involving	
incarceration,	not	that	a	right	to	counsel	exists	in	all	such	cases.”126	
As	 to	 the	 facts	 in	 Turner	 itself,	 the	 Court	 applied	 the	 following	
analytical	framework:	
[W]e	consequently	determine	the	“specific	dictates	of	due	process”	
by	 examining	 the	 “distinct	 factors”	 that	 this	 Court	 has	 previously	
found	useful	in	deciding	what	specific	safeguards	the	Constitution’s	
Due	 Process	 Clause	 requires	 in	 order	 to	 make	 a	 civil	 proceeding	
fundamentally	 fair.	 As	 relevant	 here	 those	 factors	 include	 (1)	 the	
nature	 of	 “the	 private	 interest	 that	 will	 be	 affected,”	 (2)	 the	















not	 providing	 “additional	 or	 substitute	 procedural	
requirement[s].”127	
The	 Court	 said	 that	 Turner’s	 interest	 in	 remaining	 free	 from	
incarceration	 “argues	 strongly	 for	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 that	 Turner	
advocates.”128	 Indeed,	 Turner	 was	 indigent	 and	 faced—and	 served—
jail	 time.129	 Nevertheless,	 Turner	 failed	 to	 persuade	 the	 Court	 that	
fundamental	 fairness	 required	 appointment	 of	 state-funded	 counsel.	
Instead,	 the	Turner	 Court	 focused	upon	 the	 circumstances	of	Rebecca	
Rogers,	 the	 mother	 of	 Turner’s	 child.	 The	 Court	 emphasized	 that	
Rogers	 was	 unrepresented	 by	 legal	 counsel.	 Because	 Rogers	 (like	
Turner)	was	unrepresented	by	a	lawyer,	from	the	Court’s	perspective,	
the	appointment	of	counsel	for	Turner	
could	 create	 an	 asymmetry	 of	 representation	 that	 would	 “alter	
significantly	 the	nature	of	 the	proceeding.”	Doing	so	could	mean	a	
degree	 of	 formality	 or	 delay	 that	 would	 unduly	 slow	 payment	 to	
those	 immediately	 in	 need.	 And,	 perhaps	 more	 important	 for	
present	 purposes,	 doing	 so	 could	 make	 the	 proceedings	 less	 fair	
overall,	 increasing	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 decision	 that	 would	 erroneously	
deprive	a	family	of	the	support	it	is	entitled	to	receive.	The	needs	of	
such	families	play	an	important	role	in	our	analysis.130	


















the	 Due	 Process	 Clause	 does	 not	 automatically	 require	 the	
provision	 of	 counsel	 at	 civil	 contempt	 proceedings	 to	 an	
indigent	 individual	 who	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 child	 support	 order,	
even	if	that	individual	faces	incarceration	(for	up	to	a	year).	In	
particular,	 that	 Clause	 does	 not	 require	 the	 provision	 of	
counsel	 where	 the	 opposing	 parent	 or	 other	 custodian	 (to	
whom	support	funds	are	owed)	is	not	represented	by	counsel	
and	 the	 State	 provides	 alternative	 procedural	 safeguards	
equivalent	 to	 those	we	 have	mentioned	 (adequate	 notice	 of	
the	 importance	of	ability	 to	pay,	 fair	opportunity	 to	present,	
and	to	dispute,	relevant	information,	and	court	findings).133	
In	essence,	in	civil	contempt	child	support	cases,	Turner	holds	that	
the	defendant	does	not	 automatically	have	a	 right	 to	 court	 appointed	
counsel	where:	(1)	his	failure	to	pay	will	subject	him	to	incarceration,	
(2)	the	custodial	parent	or	guardian	is	not	represented	by	a	lawyer,	and	
(3)	 adequate	 process	 protections	 exist	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 the	
indigent	individual	can	pay.134	
Applying	 its	 due	 process	 test	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 Turner,	 the	 Court	
nonetheless	vacated	the	decision	of	the	South	Carolina	Supreme	Court,	
which	had	denied	relief	 to	Turner.	The	Supreme	Court	noted	 that	 the	
South	 Carolina	 state	 courts	 had	 failed	 to	 conduct	 a	 proper	 inquiry	





the	 majority’s	 view	 of	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 is	 correct,	 then	 the	 Due	
Process	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	would	“render	the	Sixth	













The	majority	 is	 correct,	 therefore,	 that	 the	Court’s	precedent	does	
not	 require	 appointed	 counsel	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 deprivation	 of	
liberty.	.	.	.	But	a	more	complete	description	of	 this	Court’s	cases	 is	
that	even	when	liberty	is	at	stake,	the	Court	has	required	appointed	
counsel	 in	a	category	of	cases	only	where	 it	would	have	 found	the	
Sixth	Amendment	required	it—in	criminal	prosecutions.138	
While	 the	entire	Turner	Court	 (majority	and	dissent)	agreed	 that	
the	Sixth	Amendment	is	inapplicable	to	civil	cases,139	the	better	view	is	
that	 the	 Sixth	 and	 Fourteenth	 Amendments	 should	 be	 read	






intent	 to	 commit	 a	 misdemeanor.	 In	 Florida,	 that	 was	 a	 felony.	
Accordingly,	 Gideon	 was	 subject	 to	 criminal	 prosecution	 which	
jeopardized	his	liberty.	
2.	 Assuming	that	when	Gideon	broke	into	the	pool	hall	that	Gideon	
damaged	 the	 pool	 hall	 owner’s	 property,	 a	 court	 could	 compel	




Gideon	 might	 be	 charged	 with	 a	 capital	 offense.	 In	 that	 case,	
Gideon’s	life	would	be	at	stake.	
In	this	reimagined	scenario,	as	in	the	original	case,	Gideon	would	
face	 criminal	 proceedings.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 would	
apply.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 should	 be	 read	 as	
furnishing	additional	protection	for	the	right	to	counsel	because	in	the	
amended	 scenario,	 Gideon	 has	 so	much	 at	 stake:	 his	 life,	 liberty,	 and	
property.	 In	 such	 circumstances,	 rather	 than	 making	 the	 Sixth	









other	 words,	 while	 the	 Framers	 of	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 placed	 the	
right	to	counsel	in	a	prominent	place	in	the	Constitution’s	architecture,	
the	Framers	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	provided	secondary	human	
rights	 insurance	 coverage.	 The	 Sixth	 and	 Fourteenth	 Amendments	
establish	a	comprehensive,	sturdy	fortress	securing	individual	freedom	
including	the	rights	to	life,	liberty,	and	property.	




without	 due	 process	 of	 law	 .	.	.	.”140	 Individuals’	 property	 and	 their	
liberty	can	be	adversely	affected	in	criminal	and	in	civil	cases.	Literally,	
the	 Amendment	 applies	 to	 all	 circumstances	 (civil	 and	 criminal)	 in	
which	a	state	could	deprive	a	person	of	life,	liberty,	or	property.	
The	 Turner	 decision	 is	 an	 example.	 Michael	 Turner	 went	 to	 jail,	
and	he	had	to	pay	child	support	out	of	his	own	material	assets.	So,	the	
Fourteenth	 Amendment’s	 text,	 read	 liberally	 to	 protect	 human	
freedom,141	applies	to	civil	cases	too.	Perceived	from	this	constitutional	
perch,	 the	 Framers	 devised	 sturdy	 constitutional	 safeguards	 to	
promote	and	protect	national	values	central	to	the	establishment	of	the	
United	 States:	 universal	 freedom	 and	 equality	 espoused	 in	 the	
Declaration	of	Independence.142	
In	this	context,	there	is	a	compelling	reason	why	the	Due	Process	
Clause	 could	 and	 should	 be	 read	 to	 require	 appointed	 counsel	 for	
Turner,	his	wife,	and	his	child.	Both	parents	and	their	child	have	basic	
human	needs	at	stake:	(a)	Turner’s	liberty	and	property;	(b)	the	child’s	
human	 material	 necessaries;	 and	 (c)	 the	 wife’s	 need	 of	 financial	
resources	to	care	for	the	child.	The	Turner	majority’s	cramped	reading	
of	 the	 Constitution	 reduces	 the	 scope	 of	 human	 freedom	 for	 indigent	










How	 easy	 is	 it	 for	 a	 person	 sitting	 in	 jail	 to	 interview	 for	
employment,	obtain	a	 job,	and	earn	enough	money	 for	child	support?	
Indeed,	how	can	one	 seriously	argue	 that	 in	 child	 support	or	 custody	
hearings,	the	best	interests	of	the	child	require	that	neither	parent	have	
a	lawyer?	That	is	the	practical	effect	of	Turner.	If	the	custodial	parent	is	
unrepresented,	 the	 non-custodial	 parent	 is	 not	 entitled	 to	 a	 state-
appointed	lawyer	either.	And	what	about	the	poor	child?	Does	anyone	
in	this	indigent	family	have	a	constitutionally	protected	right	to	counsel	




The	 Article	 now	 sketches	 and	 affirms	 substantive	 proposals	
contained	in	ABA	Resolution	112A144	setting	forth	the	parameters	of	a	
right	 to	 counsel	 for	 indigent	 persons	 in	 specified	 civil	 adversarial	
proceedings,	namely	those	in	which	basic	human	needs	are	at	stake.	
III.	ABA	RESOLUTION	112A:	AN	OVERVIEW	
Justice	 Rutledge	 eloquently	 articulated	 treasured	 national	 values	
when	 he	 declared:	 “Equality	 before	 the	 law	 in	 a	 true	 democracy	 is	 a	
matter	of	right.	It	cannot	be	a	matter	of	charity	or	of	favor	or	of	grace	or	
of	discretion.”145	
However,	 in	August	 2006,	 the	ABA	House	 of	Delegates	 (the	ABA	
House)	acknowledged	a	sordid	fact:	
Not	only	has	equality	before	 the	 law	remained	merely	a	matter	of	
charity	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 but	 that	 charity	 has	 proved	woefully	
inadequate.	The	lesson	from	the	past	130	years	is	that	justice	for	the	
poor	 as	 a	matter	 of	 charity	 or	 discretion	has	not	 delivered	on	 the	
promises	of	“justice	for	all”	and	“equal	justice	under	law”	that	form	










equality	 before	 the	 law	 is	 an	 illusion.	 Accordingly,	 the	 ABA	 House	
unanimously	adopted	Resolution	112A	urging:	
federal,	 state,	and	territorial	governments	 to	provide	 legal	counsel	
as	 a	 matter	 of	 right	 at	 public	 expense	 to	 low	 income	 persons	 in	
those	 categories	 of	 adversarial	 proceedings	 where	 basic	 human	
needs	 are	 at	 stake,	 such	 as	 those	 involving	 shelter,	 sustenance,	
safety,	 health	 or	 child	 custody,	 as	 determined	 by	 each	
jurisdiction.147	




•	 “Shelter”	 includes	 a	 person	 or	 family’s	 access	 to	 or	 ability	 to	
remain	 in	 an	 apartment	 or	 house,	 and	 the	 habitability	 of	 that	
shelter.	
•	 “Sustenance”	 includes	 a	 person	 or	 family’s	 sources	 of	 income	
whether	 derived	 from	 employment,	 government	 monetary	
payments	 or	 “in	 kind”	 benefits	 (e.g.,	 food	 stamps).	 Typical	 legal	
proceedings	 involving	 this	basic	human	need	 include	denials	of	or	
termination	of	government	payments	or	benefits.	.	.	.	
•	 “Safety”	 includes	 protection	 from	 physical	 harm,	 such	 as	
proceedings	 to	 obtain	 or	 enforce	 restraining	 orders	 because	 of	










•	 “Child	 custody”	 embraces	 proceedings	 where	 the	 custody	 of	 a	




constitutional,	 and	 policy	 arguments	 support	 a	 governmental	




case	 involved	denial	 of	due	process	 rights	 to	 two	 individual	plaintiffs	
who	 had	 greatly	 diminished	 access	 to	 courts	 because	 the	 plaintiffs	
suffered	 paralysis	 resulting	 in	 their	 confinement	 to	 wheel	 chairs.	 In	
Lane,	the	ABA	amicus	brief	recognized	that	too	often,	courts	were	(and	
are)	constructed	without	elevators,	ramps,	and	other	features	to	enable	




to	 the	 courts;	 it	 requires	 meaningful	 access.	.	.	.	 To	 ensure	
meaningful	 access,	 particularly	 when	 an	 individual	 faces	 the	
prospect	of	coercive	State	deprivation	through	the	 judicial	process	
of	 life,	 liberty,	or	property,	due	process	often	requires	 the	State	 to	
give	 a	 litigant	 affirmative	 assistance	 so	 that	 he	may	 participate	 in	
the	 proceedings	 if	 he	 effectively	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 participate	
otherwise.151	
Thus,	while	for	practical	considerations,	Resolution	112A	calls	for	
an	 incremental	 approach	 beginning	 with	 the	 most	 pressing	 human	




Children	 in	 Custody	 Cases	 (May	 2,	 2003),	 https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam	
/aba/images/probono_public_service/ts/standards_of_practice_for_lawyers_representing_childre
n.pdf	 (including	 suggested	 criteria	 to	 decide	when	 counsel	 should	 be	 appointed	 for	 children	 in	
custody	cases).	
	 149.	 ABA	Resolution	112A,	supra	note	6,	at	6.	





the	Resolution	 also	 is	 based	upon	 a	 broader	 articulation	of	American	
values	going	back	to	the	Declaration	of	Independence	and	encapsulated	
in	five	words:	liberty	and	justice	for	all.152	
For	 the	 reasons	 set	 forth	 in	 Part	 II,	 at	 the	 very	 least	 the	
Constitution	 provides	 protection	 for	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 for	 indigent	
persons	 in	 civil	 adversarial	 proceedings.153	 Indigent	 litigants	 facing	
deprivation	of	liberty	or	property	in	civil	cases	have	no	less	freedom	to	
defend	 themselves	 than	 do	 materially	 affluent	 participants	 in	 such	
proceedings.	
Moreover,	 according	 to	 the	 Legal	 Services	 Corporation’s	 (LSC’s)	
2017	 Justice	 Gap	 Report,	 indigent	 civil	 litigants	 have	 an	 immense	
unmet	 need	 for	 legal	 representation.	 The	 2017	 Justice	 Gap	 Report	
outlined	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 “justice	 gap,”	 that	 is	 the	 “difference	
between	 the	 civil	 legal	 needs	 of	 low-income	 Americans	 and	 the	




Further,	 four	 out	 of	 every	 five	 low-income	 individuals	with	 legal	
problems	 do	 not	 even	 seek	 professional	 legal	 assistance.157	 Many	
indigent	 individuals	 don’t	 know	 where	 to	 start	 seeking	 resources.	
Others	 might	 not	 recognize	 that	 their	 situations	 require	 legal	
assistance.	And	yet	others	simply	opt	 to	 try	and	handle	 the	dilemmas	
themselves	 using	 whatever	 resources	 are	 available	 (for	 instance,	
informal	advice	from	family	and	friends).158	In	short,	only	20%	of	low-
income	 individuals	with	 legal	 difficulties	 seek	 expert	 legal	 assistance.	











needing	 expert	 legal	 assistance	 seek	 such	 assistance,	 then	 that	 means	 the	 other	 80%	 are	 very	
unlikely	 to	receive	such	expert	 legal	help.	To	compound	matters,	 if	nearly	90%	of	 those	who	do	
seek	help	report	receiving	no	or	inadequate	help,	that	suggests	that	only	10%	of	the	20%	seeking	
assistance	might	be	receiving	adequate	aid.	Since	10%	of	20%	is	2%,	one	wonders	whether	only	




To	 make	 matters	 worse,	 the	 Justice	 Gap	 Report	 estimates	 that	
nearly	70%	of	 indigent	persons	will	have	at	 least	one	significant	 legal	
problem	in	the	course	of	a	year.160	 In	fact,	 the	majority	of	 low-income	
persons	 will	 have	 multiple	 legal	 problems.	 At	 least	 55%	 of	 such	
individuals	 will	 have	 at	 least	 two	 challenges.	 Indeed,	 some	 sub-
populations,	 like	 veterans	 and	 victims	 of	 recent	 episodes	 of	 domestic	
violence,	report	significantly	higher	incidences	of	legal	difficulties.	For	
impoverished	 veterans,	 71%	 of	 households	 confront	 legal	
challenges.161	 Distressingly,	 over	 97%	 of	 households	 with	 recent	
domestic	violence	victims	wrestle	with	such	difficulties.162	
And	what	 are	 examples	 of	 such	 challenges?	 They	 run	 the	 gamut	
from	 child	 support	 enforcement	 (as	 in	 Turner);163	 to	 denial	 of	
veterans164	 or	 social	 security	 benefits;165	 to	 housing	 eviction;166	 and	
fending	off	creditors	who	are	often	seeking	payment	for	health-related	




Corporation	 grantees	 for	 resolution,	 but	 “these	 estimated	 1.7	million	
civil	 legal	 problems	 represent	 less	 than	 6%	 of	 the	 total	 civil	 legal	
problems	faced	by	low-income	Americans.”169	Stated	differently,	nearly	
95%	of	indigent	Americans’	legal	problems	are	not	addressed	by	legal	
aid	 organizations.	 In	 practical	 terms,	 the	 Justice	 Gap	 Report	 suggests	
that	 as	 many	 as	 twenty-eight	 million	 legal	 problems	 confronting	




The	 upshot	 of	 all	 of	 this	 is	 that	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 materially	















Rutledge’s	 stirring	 affirmation	 notwithstanding,	 in	 the	 United	 States,	
liberty	and	justice	for	all	remains,	to	put	it	mildly,	an	elusive	goal.	One	
wonders	whether	when	 it	 comes	 to	meaningful	 access	 to	 justice,	 the	
situation	of	materially	impoverished	persons	in	the	United	States	is	like	
that	 of	 African	 Americans	 following	 the	 Civil	War.	 African	 Americans	
looked	 forward	 to	 a	 “new	 birth	 of	 freedom”171	 and	 viewed	 the	
Thirteenth,	 Fourteenth,	 and	 Fifteenth	 Amendments	 as	 places	 of	 legal	
refuge	 from	 legal	 oppression.	 African	 Americans	 instead	 discovered,	
painfully	 and	 frequently,	 that	 the	 promises	 of	 refuge	 were	 merely	
“splendid	baubles,	 thrown	out	 to	delude	 those	who	deserved	 fair	and	
generous	treatment	at	the	hands	of	the	nation.”172	Often	that	is	the	way	
it	is	with	indigent	individuals	in	civil	legal	proceedings.	
To	 give	 a	 practical	 example,	 suppose	 that	 a	 landlord	 refuses	 to	
comply	 with	 his	 obligations	 under	 the	 Department	 of	 Housing	 and	
Urban	Development’s	Section	8	Program.	If	the	landlord	subsequently	
seeks	 to	 evict	 a	 senior	 citizen	 on	 a	 fixed	 income	 who	 has	 no	 legal	




a	 practical,	 incremental	 step	 toward	 the	 wider	 imperative	 of	
meaningful	 access	 to	 civil	 legal	 proceedings.174	 In	 some	 respects,	 the	
ABA	 Resolution	 represented	 the	 ABA	House	 of	 Delegates’	 attempt	 to	
construct	 a	 firm	 foundation	 for	 protecting	 the	 human	 rights	 of	
materially	 indigent	 persons	 in	 civil	 cases.	 But	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
human	 right	 to	 counsel	 for	 indigent	 persons	 in	 civil	 cases,	 to	
paraphrase	Robert	Frost,	America	yet	has	“promises	to	keep,	and	miles	
to	go	before	[we	can]	sleep.”175	
Part	 IV	 of	 this	 Article	 briefly	 appeals	 to	 readers	 to	 consider	 a	
paradigm	 shift	 to	 address	 the	 pressing	 needs	 of	 individuals	 who	 are	
materially	indigent.	
	













our	 race,	 our	 tribe,	 our	 class,	 and	 our	 nation;	 and	 this	means	we	
must	develop	a	world	perspective.	No	 individual	 can	 live	alone;	no	
nation	can	live	alone.	.	.	.	 [W]e	must	either	 learn	to	 live	together	as	





perish	 together	 as	 fools.”177	 King	 died	 fighting	 for	 the	 rights	 of	 all	
humans—especially	 persons	 like	 Clarence	 Earl	 Gideon	 who	 found	
themselves	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 social	 hierarchy.	 At	 King’s	 death,	 he	
was	marching	with	sanitation	workers	 in	Memphis	and	on	his	way	to	
lead	a	Poor	People’s	Campaign	 in	Washington,	D.C.178	King	knew	 that	
America	 could	 never	 achieve	 its	 greatest	 potential	 unless	 all	 people	
were	 able	 to	 exercise	 their	 human	 rights	 to	 the	 maximum	 extent	
possible.	Maximizing	human	potential	 is	easier	when	people	know,	as	
well	as	are	able,	to	defend	and	exercise	their	human	rights.	
And	 that	 is	where	 lawyers	 come	 in.	As	 the	LSC	has	documented,	
tens	 of	 millions	 of	 Americans	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 affordable	 legal	
services.	 Accordingly,	 those	 individuals	 are	 stymied	 in	 enjoying	
constitutionally	 protected	 freedoms.179	 On	 a	 daily	 basis,	 without	 the	
guidance	and	protection	that	a	lawyer	can	furnish,	such	individuals	are	
deprived	 of	 what	 ABA	 House	 Resolution	 112A	 refers	 to	 as	 “basic	
human	needs.”180	The	ABA	Resolution	said:	
[W]hen	 parties	 lack	 counsel	 in	 civil	 proceedings	.	.	.	 to	 insure	 that	
justice	 is	 done	 in	 cases	 involving	 pro	 se	 litigants,	 courts	 must	
struggle	 with	 issues	 of	 preserving	 judicial	 neutrality	 (where	 one	
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side	 is	 represented	 and	 the	 other	 is	 not),	 balancing	 competing	
demands	 for	 court	 time,	 and	 achieving	 an	 outcome	 that	 is	
understood	 by	 pro	 se	 participants	 and	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 further	
proceedings	before	 finality	 is	 reached.	Meantime	 large	numbers	of	
pro	 se	 litigants	 lose	 their	 families,	 their	 housing,	 their	 livelihood,	
and	like	fundamental	interests,	losses	many	of	them	would	not	have	
sustained	if	represented	by	counsel.181	
What	 situation	 does	 Resolution	 112A	 describe?	 Could	 it	 be	 the	
quintessential	 exemplar	 of	 a	 deprivation	 of	 liberty	 and	 property	
without	due	process	of	law?	
More	 to	 the	point,	why	does	 this	ongoing	national	nightmare	 for	
millions	of	Americans	continue	unabated?	Perhaps	it	is	in	part	because	
we	as	humans	are	often	blinded	by	our	own	narrow-minded	thinking.	
Dr.	 King	 gave	 a	 telling	 practical	 example	 based	 on	 his	 experience	
conversing	with	 the	white	 jailers	who	wanted	 to	 talk	with	him	about	
race	while	they	had	King	locked	up	in	a	Birmingham	jail.	King	stated:	
[W]e	got	down	one	day	to	the	point—that	was	the	second	or	third	
day—to	 talk	 about	 where	 they	 lived,	 and	 how	 much	 they	 were	
earning.	And	when	those	brothers	told	me	what	they	were	earning,	I	
said,	 “Now,	 you	 know	 what?	 You	 ought	 to	 be	 marching	 with	 us.	
You’re	 just	 as	 poor	 as	 Negroes.”	 And	 I	 said,	 “You	 are	 put	 in	 the	
position	 of	 supporting	 your	 oppressor.	 Because	 through	prejudice	
and	 blindness,	 you	 fail	 to	 see	 that	 the	 same	 forces	 that	 oppress	
Negroes	in	American	society	oppress	poor	white	people.	And	all	you	
are	 living	 on	 is	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 your	 skin	 being	white,	 and	 the	
drum	major	instinct	of	thinking	that	you	are	somebody	big	because	
you	are	white.	And	you’re	so	poor	you	can’t	send	your	children	 to	
school.	 You	 ought	 to	 be	 out	 here	 marching	 with	 every	 one	 of	 us	
every	time	we	have	a	march.”182	
King	saw	what	his	jailers	did	not:	that	they	were	all	“brothers”	in	





at	 264.	 The	 speech	 is	 also	 available	 online.	 Martin	 Luther	 King,	 Jr.,	 The	 Drum	 Major	 Instinct,	





ABA	Resolution	 112A	 also	 recognizes	 that	 in	 America	we	 are	 all	
part	of	a	national	community—all	 in	 it	 together—and	that	 if	 the	 legal	
system	is	 to	retain	 legitimacy,	 the	system	must	be	made	to	work	well	
for	everyone.	In	this	vein,	Resolution	112A	presciently	notes	that	“the	
perception	the	courts	do	not	treat	poor	people	fairly	has	consequences	
for	 the	 system	 itself.”183	 As	 California	 Chief	 Justice	 Ronald	 George	
recently	 observed,	 “[E]very	 day	 the	 administration	 of	 justice	 is	





urgent	when	we	recognize	 that	 failure	 to	do	 so	 can	unleash	powerful	
centrifugal	 forces	 that	 can	 rend	 America	 asunder.	 Such	 destructive	
impulses	 erupt	 when	 persons	 lose	 hope.	 And	 in	 a	 global	 context	 in	
which	 international	 competitors	 or	 adversaries	 attempt	 to	 disrupt	
national	elections186	as	well	as	steal	the	private	information	of	millions	
of	citizens,187	why	would	policy	makers	add	to	America’s	vulnerabilities	
by	 effectively	 barring	 the	 doors	 of	 justice	 to	 millions?	 The	 denial	 of	
access	 to	 justice	 can	 only	 have	 deleterious	 impacts	 on	 America’s	
societal	stability	and	progress.	
So,	the	questions	are:	If	not	now,	when	will	liberty	and	justice	for	
all	 roll	 on	 like	 waters?	 And	 when	 will	 the	 moral	 revolution—the	
paradigm	 shift	 in	 human	 consciousness	 needed	 to	 effect	 constructive	
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